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Abstract
The classical bankruptcy problem (O’Neill, 1982) is extended by assuming
that the agents have non-homogenous preferences over several estates. A
special case is the one in which there are finitely many estates and the
agents have homogenous preferences, i.e., constant utilities, per estate. In
the general case, i.e., the infinite estate problem, players have arbitrary
preferences over an interval of real numbers each of which is regarded
as an estate. A strategic game is formulated in which each agent/player
distributes his legal entitlement over the estates, resulting in individual
claims per estate: each estate is then divided proportionally according to
these individual claims. The focus of the paper is on the study of Nash
equilibria, in particular on their existence, in finite and infinite estate
games. It is also shown that, generally speaking, Nash equilibria are not
unique nor Pareto optimal but that they are Pareto optimal in a second
best sense: they do not Pareto dominate each other. The paper concludes
with a brief consideration of envy-freeness.
JEL Classification numbers: C72, D63
Keywords: Bankruptcy problem, estate division, non-homogenous preferences
1 Introduction
The classical bankruptcy problem (O’Neill, 1982; Aumann and Maschler, 1985)
is the problem of dividing an estate – for instance a heritage if someone has died,
or the leftovers from a bankrupt firm – among a group of claimants who have
legal entitlements to the estate – for instance family members, debt holders,
share holders. This problem has been approached in a normative, axiomatic
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way: see Thomson (2003) for an overview of such approaches. Starting with
O’Neill (1982) and extended by Atlamaz et al. (2008), the problem has also been
approached strategically, by formulating a non-cooperative game associated with
the bankruptcy problem and investigating its Nash equilibria.
In the original bankruptcy problem preferences are assumed to be homoge-
nous: basically, the estate is an amount of money and each agent wants to max-
imize his allocation. In the present paper preferences can be non-homogenous.
We model this by assuming that there is a finite or infinite number of estates:
per estate each agent’s preference is homogenous, expressed by a constant utility
value, but across estates an agent’s preference may vary. In the case of infinitely
many estates, we assume that each estate is a point in the interval [0, 1], and an
agent’s preference is represented by a utility function defined on this interval. In
a typical example, the estate is a (one-dimensional) piece of land, and agents do
not only care about the amount of land they obtain but also about the quality,
where different agents may value pieces of land differently. The non-cooperative
game we consider is similar to the one already proposed by O’Neill (1982) and
Atlamaz et al. (2008). Each agent distributes his legal entitlement over the
estates, and each estate is divided proportionally to the individual claims on it.
The game bears resemblance to certain procedures proposed in the fair division
literature, see for instance Brams and Taylor (1996).
Throughout the paper we use the estate division terminology, but the model
has applications other than the division of an heritage or the leftovers of a
bankrupt firm. For instance, one may think of the interval [0, 1] as a continuum
of uniformly distributed consumers (cf. Hotelling, 1929), and of the claimants
as firms who provide services to these consumers, with each firm providing total
service equal to its entitlement. In this case, each part of the consumer con-
tinuum is distributed proportionally with respect to the claims – now called
investments – of the firms. Note that this interpretation naturally allows for
competitive investments by different firms in one and the same consumer seg-
ment, thus, for multiple claims in our model.
Other applications concern political problems, auctions, or problems of land
division. The shares of the players may be interpreted as probabilities of winning
in political elections (Merolla, Munger, and Tofias, 2003) or auctions (Cramton,
Gibbons, and Klemperer, 1987). Land division has already been mentioned
above; see Berliant (1985) and Berliant et al. (1992), among others. In the model
with finitely many estates another potential application may arise by regarding
the estates as finitely many roads from A to B. The agents are transportation
companies who distribute their trucks over different roads, and the road capacity
is shared proportionally to the numbers of trucks: in this application, though,
it would be more realistic to let the utility of an estate, viz. the use of a road,
depend on the total claim put on it. See Gairing et al. (2009).
The main part of this paper is devoted to characterizing and establishing
existence of Nash equilibria. We first prove the existence of so-called ε-equilibria
in the model with finitely many estates by a fixed point argument. In an ε-
equilibrium each player is obliged to put a claim of minimally ε on each estate.
Existence of Nash equilibria (i.e., ε = 0) is then obtained by a limit argument. A
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direct proof of this would be complicated by the fact that best replies need not
exist. Next, we introduce the infinite estate model and show existence of Nash
equilibrium by a limit argument using the finite estate game. Finally, we present
an example in which Nash equilibrium does not have to be unique, but identify
a special class of estate games that do have a unique Nash equilibrium. We
also show that, although Nash equilibria are not unique in general, they cannot
Pareto dominate each other. We conclude with a consideration of envy-freeness
of equilibrium allocations.
2 The finite estate problem
2.1 The finite estate problem and the finite estate game
A set M = {1, . . . ,m} of estates is to be divided among a set N = {1, . . . , n}
of agents. Throughout, m > 1 and n > 2. Each agent i has an entitlement
ci > 0, and a utility uis > 0 for ownership of the complete estate s. We write
ui = (ui1, . . . , uim). The quadruple
(M,N, c, u) ,
where u = (u1, . . . , un) and c = (c1, . . . , cn), is a finite estate problem.
A solution to the finite estate problem is an allocation of shares of the estates
to the agents. More precisely, if xis > 0 is the share of estate s allocated to
agent i, then x = ((xis)s∈M )i∈N is a solution if
∑
i∈N xis 6 1 for all s ∈ M .
Agent i’s utility from x is given by ui(x) =
∑
s∈M xisuis. The purpose of this
paper is to find solutions as equilibrium outcomes of a non-cooperative game
which, naturally, takes the data (c, u) of the problem into consideration.
To this end, with each finite estate problem (M,N, c, u) a finite estate game
(S, pi) is associated in the following way. The players of the game are the agents
of the estate problem. A strategy of player i is a vector σi = (σis)s∈M of non-
negative numbers, where σis denotes the claim that player i places on estate s,
such that ∑
s∈M
σis = mci . (1)
Remark 2.1 To interpret condition (1) one can think of them estates as pieces
of land of equal area, with total area equal to 1. The number σis is thought of
as the height of player i’s claim on estate s. Since the area of estate s is 1/m,
player i spends σis/m of his entitlement ci on estate s. This interpretation and
the associated condition (1) are convenient when later in the paper the finite
model is extended to an infinite model of estate division.
The strategy set of player i is denoted by Si, and S =
∏
j∈N Sj is the set of
strategy profiles. The payoff player i receives from estate s at the strategy
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profile σ = (σj)j∈N ∈ S is
piis(σ) =

σis
n∑
j=1
σjs
· uis if σis > 0
0 if σis = 0 .
The total payoff of player i at the strategy profile σ is pii(σ) =
∑
s∈M piis(σ).
Clearly, ((xis)s∈M )i∈N with xis = σis/
∑
j∈N σjs if σis > 0 and xis = 0 other-
wise for all s ∈ M and i ∈ N , is a solution to the finite estate problem: in this
solution, each estate is divided among the players in proportion to their claims
on it.
Definition 2.2 A strategy profile σ is a Nash equilibrium in (S, pi) if for all
i ∈ N
pii(σ) ≥ pii(σ | τi)
for all τi ∈ Si, where (σ | τi) is the strategy profile in which player i plays
strategy τi while all other players j play σj .
Notation For a finite estate problem (M,N, c, u) we denote C =
∑
i∈N ci, c¯
=
min{ci | i ∈ N}, c¯ = max{ci | i ∈ N}, u¯ = min{uis | i ∈ N, s ∈ M}, and
u¯ = max{uis | i ∈ N, s ∈M}.
2.2 Existence of Nash equilibrium in the finite estate game
Throughout the remainder of this section we consider the finite estate game
(S, pi) associated with the finite estate problem (M,N, c, u). The proof of ex-
istence of Nash equilibrium in this game is complicated by the fact that best
replies do not always exist. If for some estate s and strategy profile σ ∈ S we
have σjs = 0 for all j 6= i, then player i does not have a best reply to σ: for
τi to be a best reply we need τis > 0 but then player i improves his payoff
by decreasing τis (he still obtains all of s since no other player claims it) and
increasing his claim on some estate claimed by at least one other player.
In order to circumvent this difficulty we introduce ε-equilibria and show
existence of Nash equilibrium by letting ε go to zero. For any 0 6 ε < c
¯
let
Sεi = {σi ∈ Si | σis > ε for all s ∈M}, and Sε =
∏
i∈N S
ε
i . Then σ ∈ Sε is an
ε-equilibrium in (S, pi) if pii(σ) > pii(σ | τi) for all i ∈ N and τi ∈ Sεi . Clearly,
for ε = 0 an ε-equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
For a strategy profile σ, write Ts =
∑
i∈N σis and yis =
∑
j∈N\{i} σjs =
Ts − σis. (If no confusion is likely the dependence of these numbers on σ is
suppressed from notation.) Note that
∑
s∈M Ts = m
∑
i∈N ci = mC. The
following lemma characterizes ε-equilibria and, for ε = 0, Nash equilibria in
(S, pi). A proof can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 2.3 Let 0 6 ε < c
¯
. The strategy profile σ ∈ Sε is an ε-equilibrium if
and only if Ts > 0 for all s ∈M and for every player i there exists λi > 0 such
that
λi >
yis
T 2s
· uis
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for all s ∈M , with equality if σis > ε.
For each player i the number λi in Lemma 2.3 is the marginal utility of each
positively claimed estate s in the strategy profile σ. Usually we will refer to the
numbers λi as the marginal utilities associated with the equilibrium profile σ.
A straightforward consequence of Lemma 2.3 is the following.
Lemma 2.4 Let 0 6 ε < c
¯
. If σ ∈ Sε is an ε-equilibrium with associated
marginal utilities λ1, . . . , λn, then for all i ∈ N and s ∈M with σis > ε we have
σis = Ts − λiT 2s /uis.
Our first result is that ε-equilibria exist for positive ε.
Proposition 2.5 Let 0 < ε < c
¯
. Then there exists an ε-equilibrium.
Proof. We construct a map F : Sε → Sε, as follows. Let σ ∈ Sε with as-
sociated Ts and yis for s ∈ M and i ∈ N . For each i ∈ N , define fi(λi) =∑
s∈M max{ε, Ts−λiT 2s /uis} for all λi > 0. Then fi(0) >
∑
s∈M Ts = m
∑
j∈N cj
> mci, and fi is strictly decreasing until it reaches its minimum mε < mci. Let
λσi denote the unique (and positive) value of λi for which fi(λi) = mci, and
define F (σ)is = max{ε, Ts−λσi T 2s /uis} for all s ∈M . The map F is continuous
and by Brouwer’s Theorem has a fixed point σ∗.
Consider player i. Then, for all s ∈ M , σ∗is = F (σ∗)is = max{ε, T ∗s −
λσ
∗
i (T
∗
s )2/uis}, where T ∗s is associated with σ∗. Hence, σ∗is > T ∗s −λσ
∗
i (T
∗
s )2/uis,
which implies λ∗i > y∗isuis/(T ∗s )2 (where y∗is is associated with σ∗), with equality
if σ∗is > ε. Obviously, T
∗
s > 0 for all s ∈ M . Thus, by Lemma 2.3, σ∗ is an
ε-equilibrium. ¤
The proof of Proposition 2.5 would hold for ε = 0 as well if one could show
that Ts > 0 for all s also in that case. Instead, we will prove existence of a Nash
equilibrium by applying a limit argument for ε approaching 0. We first establish
positive lower and upper bounds on the marginal utilities and the total claims
in an ε-equilibrium for all ε > 0. These bounds do not depend on ε or on the
number of estates m. They are used in the existence proof of Nash equilibrium
in the finite estate game, and also in the infinite estate game in the next section.
Lemma 2.6 Let 0 6 ε < c
¯
and let σ ∈ Sε be an ε-equilibrium with associated
marginal utilities λ1, . . . , λn and total claims T1, . . . , Tm.
(a) For all i ∈ N : λi 6 u¯/c¯ .
(b) For all s ∈M : Ts > (n− 1)u¯ c¯/nu¯ .
(c) For all s ∈M : Ts 6 2Cu¯/u¯ .
(d) For all i ∈ N : λi > u¯
2c
¯
/2u¯C2 .
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Proof.
(a) Let i ∈ N . There must be an sˆ ∈ M such that σisˆ > ci > ε (since∑
s∈M σis = mci). Then by Lemma 2.3
λi =
yisˆuisˆ
T 2sˆ
=
yisˆ
Tsˆ
· 1
Tsˆ
· uisˆ 6 1 · 1
σisˆ
· u¯ 6 u¯
ci
6 u¯
c
¯
.
(b) Let s ∈M . Then by Lemma 2.3∑
i∈N
λi >
∑
i∈N
yisuis
(Ts)2
>
u
¯
∑
i∈N yis
(Ts)2
=
u
¯
(n− 1)Ts
(Ts)2
=
u
¯
(n− 1)
Ts
. (2)
Hence Ts > u¯(n−1)/
∑
i∈N λi > (n−1)u¯c¯/nu¯, where the last inequality followsfrom part (a).
(c) First, let r ∈ M and i, j ∈ N arbitrary. Clearly, yir + yjr > Tr, hence
yir/Tr > 1/2 or yjr/Tr > 1/2. Also, by Lemma 2.3, λi > yiruir/T 2r and
λj > yjrujr/T 2r . Hence
for all r ∈M and i, j ∈ N : λi > u¯/2Tr or λj > u¯/2Tr . (3)
Now take rˆ ∈ M with Trˆ 6 C (this is possible since
∑
s∈M Ts = mC), then by
applying (3) with r = rˆ we obtain
for all i, j ∈ N : λi > u¯/2C or λj > u¯/2C . (4)
Let s ∈M . If Ts 6 (n− 1)c¯+ c¯ then Ts 6 2Cu¯/u¯ and we are done. Otherwise,
Ts > (n − 1)c¯ + c¯ and so there must be at least two players, say i and j,with σis > ε and σjs > ε. Then by Lemma 2.3, λi = yisuis/T 2s 6 u¯/Ts and
λj = yjsujs/T 2s 6 u¯/Ts. By (4) this implies u¯/Ts > u¯/2C, hence Ts 6 2Cu¯/u¯.
(d) Let i ∈ N . There is an estate r ∈M such that yir/Tr > c¯/C since otherwise∑
s∈M yis <
∑
s∈M Ts · c¯/C, hence m(C − ci) < mC · c¯/C and so C − ci < c¯, acontradiction. Then
λi >
yiruir
T 2r
> c¯
C
· uir
Tr
> c¯
C
· u¯
2Cu¯
· u
¯
=
u
¯
2c
¯
2u¯C2
.
Here, the first inequality follows from Lemma 2.3 and the third from part (c). ¤
Existence of a Nash equilibrium, i.e., of a 0-equilibrium, can now be proved
by letting ε approach zero, as follows.
Theorem 2.7 The finite estate problem (S, pi) has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Take a decreasing sequence 0 < ε1, ε2, . . . converging to 0 with ε1 < c¯
, and
for each k ∈ N an εk-equilibrium σk with associated marginal utilities (λki )i∈N .
We may assume without loss of generality that σk → σ for some σ ∈ S, and in
view of Lemma 2.6 we may assume that there are 0 < λi ∈ R such that λki → λi
for all i ∈ N . Again by Lemma 2.6, all Ts associated with σ are positive. The
remainder of the proof that σ is a Nash equilibrium, is then straightforward by
checking the conditions in Lemma 2.3 for σ and ε = 0. ¤
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3 The infinite estate problem
3.1 The infinite estate problem and game
The estates are now identified with points in the interval [0, 1]. Each agent
i ∈ N has entitlement ci > 0 and utility function ui : [0, 1] → (0,∞) which
is piecewise continuous1 and positively bounded, i.e., there are u
¯i
, u¯i ∈ R such
that 0 < u
¯i
6 ui(s) 6 u¯i for all s ∈ [0, 1]. The pair (c, u) = ((ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) is
an (infinite) estate problem.
Remark 3.1 A solution to such a problem is an n-tuple (x1, . . . , xn), where
for each i ∈ N , xi : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a measurable (with respect to the Borel-
Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]) function such that
∑
i∈N xi(s) ≤ 1 for all s ∈ [0, 1].
If X is a measurable subset of [0, 1] then agent i derives utility
∫
X
xi(s)ui(s) ds
from X. The function xi can be interpreted as representing shares allocated to
agent i, but also as a probability density function: then
∫
X
xi(s)ui(s) ds is the
expected utility agent i receives from X.
As in the finite case, we consider solutions resulting from Nash equilibria in
an associated estate game (S, p), defined as follows. The players are the agents
in N , and a strategy of player i is a piecewise continuous nonnegative function
σi on [0, 1] which satisfies
1∫
0
σi(s)ds = ci .
The interpretation is that for each (measurable) subset X ⊆ [0, 1], ∫
X
σi is
the claim put by player i on X. The strategy set of player i is denoted by
Si, and S =
∏
i∈N Si is the set of strategy profiles. For a strategy profile
σ = (σj)j∈N ∈ S and player i ∈ N , we define
σ¯i(s) =

σi(s)
n∑
j=1
σj(s)
if σi(s) > 0
0 if σi(s) = 0
for all s ∈ [0, 1]. Then player i’s payoff from σ is
pi(σ) =
1∫
0
σ¯i(s)ui(s)ds .
Definition 3.2 A strategy profile σ ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ N
pi(σ) > pi(σ | τi)
for all τi ∈ Si, where (σ | τi) is the strategy profile in which player i plays
strategy τi while all other players j play σj .
1I.e., has finitely many points of discontinuity.
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The following lemma gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy
profile σ ∈ S to be a Nash equilibrium of (S, p). We write T (s) = ∑i∈N σi(s)
and yi(s) = T (s)−σi(s) for all s ∈ [0, 1]. A proof can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 3.3 The strategy profile σ ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
T (s) > 0 for almost all s ∈ [0, 1] and for every player i there exists λi > 0 such
that
λi >
yi(s)
T (s)2
· ui(s)
for almost all s ∈ [0, 1], with equality if σi(s) > 0.2 In the latter case, σi(s) =
T (s)− λiT (s)2/ui(s).
3.2 Connection with the finite estate case
Let (M,N, c, u) be a finite estate problem. With this problem an infinite estate
problem is associated, as follows. For each agent i ∈ N define the function uˆi
on [0, 1] by
uˆi(s) =
{
uik if s ∈ [k−1m , km ), k = 1, . . . ,m
uim if s = 1.
Then (c, uˆ) = ((ci)i∈N , (uˆi)i∈N ) is an infinite estate problem. Likewise, a strat-
egy profile σ ∈ S in the finite estate game (S, pi) associated with (M,N, c, u)
can be identified with a strategy profile σˆ ∈ S in the infinite estate game (S, p)
associated with (c, uˆ) by definining for each player i ∈ N
σˆi(s) =
{
σik if s ∈ [k−1m , km ), k = 1, . . . ,m
σim if s = 1.
Then, clearly, pi(σˆ) = pii(σ) for every player i ∈ N . The games (S, pi) and (S, p),
however, are essentially different: strategies in Si do not have to be constant
on each of the m intervals in [0, 1] corresponding to the m estates of the finite
estate game. It turns out, nevertheless, that the Nash equilibria of (S, pi) and
(S, p) basically coincide.
Theorem 3.4 Let (M,N, c, u) be a finite estate problem, let (c, uˆ) be the associ-
ated infinite estate problem, and let (S, pi) and (S, p) be the associated finite and
infinite estate games. Then τ ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium in (S, p) if and only if
there is a Nash equilibrium σ ∈ S in (S, pi) such that τ = σˆ almost everywhere.
Proof. Let τ ∈ S be a Nash equilibrium in (S, p). For every k = 1, . . . ,m, we
have essentially a homogenous claim game on the intervalXk = [(k−1)/m, k/m],
as studied in Atlamaz et al. (2008), with entitlements
∫
Xk
τi for every i ∈ N .
Clearly, the restriction of τ to Xk is a Nash equilibrium in this game. By
Proposition 6.3 in Atlamaz et al. (2008) it follows that each τi is constant almost
everywhere on Xk, with constant value say σik. Then σ is a Nash equilibrium
in (S, pi) and τ = σˆ almost everywhere.
2A statement is true for almost all s ∈ [0, 1] if it is true on a subset of [0, 1] of measure 1.
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For the converse, let τ ∈ S such that τ = σˆ almost everywhere for some Nash
equilibrium σ ∈ S in (S, pi). Consider player i ∈ N and a best reply υi ∈ Si
against τ . For each k = 1 . . . ,m consider again the homogenous claim game on
Xk with entitlements
∫
Xk
τj for players j 6= i and
∫
Xk
υi for player i. Again by
Proposition 6.3 in Atlamaz et al. (2008) it follows that υi is constant almost
everywhere on each Xk. Since σ is a Nash equilibrium in (S, pi) it follows that
for the constant value of υi on Xk we can take σik for each k = 1, . . . ,m. Thus,
σˆi = τi is a best reply against τ . Since i was arbitrary, it follows that τ is a
Nash equilibrium in (S, p). ¤
3.3 Existence of Nash equilibrium in the infinite estate
game
Existence of a Nash equilibrium in the infinite estate game will be established
by approximating this game by finite estate games. The following lemma basi-
cally states that for each vector of marginal utilities there can be at most one
Nash equilibrium and, moreover, this equilibrium depends continuously on the
marginal utilities. See the Appendix for the proof.
Lemma 3.5 Let (c, u) be an infinite estate problem with associated estate game
(S, p), let s ∈ [0, 1], and let λi > 0 and σi(s) > 0, i ∈ N , satisfy
λi >
yi(s)
T (s)2
· ui(s), σi(s)[λi − yi(s)
T (s)2
· ui(s)] = 0 for all i ∈ N , (5)
where, as before, T (s) =
∑
i∈N σi(s) and yi(s) = T (s) − σi(s). Let σ′ ∈ S
also satisfy (5). Then σ′i(s) = σi(s) for all i ∈ N . Moreover, σ(s) depends
continuously on (λi, ui(s))i∈N .
We are now sufficiently equipped to prove the existence theorem.
Theorem 3.6 Let (c, u) be an infinite estate problem and let (S, p) be the as-
sociated estate game. Then (S, p) has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. For each k ∈ N let Mk = {1, . . . , k}. For each s ∈ Mk and i ∈ N let
ukis = ui(s/k). Then, for each k ∈ N, (N,Mk, c, uk) is a finite estate problem.
Let (Sk, pik) be the associated finite estate game. By Theorem 2.7 this game
has a Nash equilibrium σk with associated marginal utilities λk = (λk1 , . . . , λ
k
n).
The finite estate game (Sk, pik) can be seen as an infinite (step function) es-
tate game (Sk, pk) and by Theorem 3.6, this has a Nash equilibrium τk = σˆk
with the same associated marginal utilities λk = (λk1 , . . . , λ
k
n). By Lemma 2.6
we may assume that the marginal utilities λki converge, say λ
k
i → λi > 0
for every i ∈ N . By Lemma 3.5 we can define τi(s) = limk→∞ τki (s) for
all s ∈ [0, 1]. Since the functions τi are bounded by Lemma 2.6, the domi-
nated convergence theorem of Lebesgue implies that each τi is integrable and∫ 1
0
τi(s)ds = limk→∞
∫ 1
0
τki (s)ds = ci. Moreover, it is not difficult to prove,
using the last claim in Lemma 3.5, that each τi is continuous at each point at
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which all utility functions are continuous. Hence, the functions τi are piecewise
continuous and therefore τ ∈ S. Also by Lemma 2.6, T (s) :=∑i∈N τi(s) > 0 for
all s ∈ [0, 1]. It is straightforward to check the remaining conditions in Lemma
3.3 for τ . Hence, τ is a Nash equilibrium in (S, p). ¤
Remark 3.7 A direct proof of Theorem 3.6, i.e., a proof not based on a limiting
argument, seems to be complicated by the fact that the set of bounded piecewise
continuous functions or even of continuous functions on the interval [0, 1] is not
compact in any useful sense. This hinders application of a fixed point theorem,
such as the Schauder fixed point theorem for infinite dimensional normed vector
spaces (cf. Rudin, 1991).
4 Multiplicity, welfare, and equity properties
Apart from the nontrivial issue of existence of Nash equilibria in estate games,
there are additional questions of interest, to which we provide some answers
here. We also indicate some directions for further research.
4.1 The number of Nash equilibria
We first work out a relatively simple example, in which we have either one or
three Nash equilibria.
Example 4.1 Let M = {1, 2}, N = {1, 2}, u11 = u22 = 1, u12 = u21 = x > 0,
and c1 = c2 = 1/2. Lemma 2.3 implies the equilibrium conditions
T1 − σ11
T 21
=
T2 − σ12
T 22
· x, σ11
T 21
· x = σ12
T 22
, T1 + T2 = 2, σ11 + σ12 = 1.
Solving this system of four equations in the unknowns T1, T2, σ11, and σ12,
results in the equation
(x+ 1)2T 3 − 3(x+ 1)2T 2 + 2(x2 + 6x+ 1)T − 8x = 0,
where T = T1. Since in equilibrium both T1 and T2 are positive, we are looking
for solutions with 0 < T < 2. As can be expected, T = 1 is a solution:
this results in the symmetric equilibrium with T1 = T2 = 1, namely σ1 =
(1/(x+ 1), x/(x+ 1)) and σ2 = (x/(x+ 1), 1/(x+ 1)), as can easily be derived
from the four initial conditions. We next factor out T − 1 and obtain:
(x+ 1)2T 3 − 3(x+ 1)2T 2 + 2(x2 + 6x+ 1)T − 8x =
= (T − 1) ((x+ 1)2T 2 − 2(x+ 1)2T + 8x) = 0 .
This results in the quadratic equation
T 2 − 2T + 8x
(x+ 1)2
= 0
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which has solutions
T = 1±
√
1− 8x
(x+ 1)2
provided
8x
(x+ 1)2
< 1⇔ 0 < x2 − 6x+ 1⇔ x /∈ [3−
√
8, 3 +
√
8] .
Hence, for 3 −√8 6 x 6 3 +√8 the symmetric equilibrium is also the unique
equilibrium. For other values of x there are three equilibria: at x = 3 ± √8
the equilibrium manifold splits into three branches. For instance, if x = 6
then T1 = T = 1 ± (1/7) and T2 = 1 ∓ (1/7). For T1 = 8/7 the equilibrium is
σ = ((8/35, 27/35) , (32/35, 3/35)); for T1 = 6/7 it is σ = ((3/35, 32/35) , (27/35,
8/35)). The symmetric equilibrium is σ = ((1/7, 6/7) , (6/7, 1/7)).
The next example discusses a case in which the equilibrium is simple and
unique. In this example the players have identical preferences.
Example 4.2 Let v : [0, 1] → R be a piecewise continuous function such that
v
¯
6 v(s) 6 v¯ for each s ∈ [0, 1], where 0 < v
¯
6 v¯. Assume
∫ 1
0
v(s) ds = 1.
Consider the infinite estate problem (c, u), where each player i ∈ N has utility
function ui = v.3 Then the associated infinite estate game (S, p) has a Nash
equilibrium σ∗, given by σ∗i (s) = civ(s) for all s ∈ [0, 1]. This equilibrium is
unique up to a set of measure zero.
To see this, let σ be a Nash equilibrium with corresponding marginal utilities
λi, i ∈ N (cf. Lemma 3.3). Denote Ci = C − ci for all i ∈ N . Let i, j ∈ N and
suppose without loss of generality that λi/λj > Ci/Cj . Hence, for all s ∈ [0, 1]
with σi(s) > 0 we have
Cj
Ci
T (s)− σi(s)
T (s)2
v(s) =
Cj
Ci
λi > λj >
T (s)− σj(s)
T (s)2
v(s)
hence
Cj
Ci
(T (s)− σi(s)) > T (s)− σj(s) . (6)
Therefore
Cj =
Cj
Ci
· Ci = Cj
Ci
∫ 1
0
(T (s)− σi(s)) ds >
∫ 1
0
(T (s)− σj(s)) ds = Cj
which implies that (6) holds with equality almost everywhere. Since i and j
were arbitrary, we conclude that σ(s) = (σ1(s), . . . , σn(s)) is a solution of the
system
C1
Ci
(T (s)− σi(s)) = T (s)− σ1(s) , i ∈ N (7)
3Or a positive multiple of v, that is irrelevant.
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for almost all s. System (7) is a homogenous system of linear equations and so
every multiple of a solution is again a solution. Therefore, we can normalize
solutions by setting T (s) − σ1(s) = 1 (clearly, T (s) − σ1(s) 6= 0). Then, using
matrix notation, (7) can be written as an non-homogenous system
0 1 1 · · · 1
1 0 1 · · · 1
1 1 0 · · · 1
...
...
...
. . . 1
1 1 1 · · · 0


σ1(s)
σ2(s)
σ3(s)
...
σn(s)
 =

1
C2/C1
C3/C1
...
Cn/C1
 . (8)
The coefficient matrix is invertible and so the system has a unique solution. It
is easy to check that σ(s) = c/C1 is this solution. Hence, any Nash equilibrium
must be proportional to c, and thus σ∗ is the unique Nash equilibrium (up to a
set of measure zero).
A noteworthy further observation is that in this unique Nash equilibrium
σ∗ each player plays a max-min strategy, i.e., a strategy that maximizes the
minimal payoff, where the minimum is taken over all strategy combinations of
the opponents. To see this, note that for any σ ∈ S we have∑
i∈N
∫ 1
0
σ¯i(t)v(t)dt =
∫ 1
0
∑
i∈N
σ¯i(t)v(t)dt = 1
i.e., the sum of the payoffs of the players is constant and equal to 1. Suppose
player 1 plays σ∗1 . Following the logic above, the other players maximize their
joint payoff
∑n
i=2
∫ 1
0
σ¯i(t)v(t)dt =
∫ 1
0
∑n
i=2 σ¯i(t)v(t)dt from the strategy profile
(σ∗1 , σ2, . . . , σn) by choosing (σ2, . . . , σn) such that
∑n
i=2 σi(t) = (
∑n
i=2 ci) v(t)
for each t ∈ [0, 1]. This implies that σ∗1 guarantees a payoff of
∫ 1
0
(c1/C)v(t)dt
to player 1. In the same way, each player i ∈ N can guarantee ∫ 1
0
(ci/C)v(t)dt
by playing σ∗i . Since the sum of all these payoffs is equal to 1, each σ
∗
i is a
max-min strategy.
A general investigation of the cardinality of the set of Nash equilibria is left
for further research.
4.2 Welfare properties of Nash equilibria
How do Nash equilibria of the (in)finite estate game perform in terms of welfare?
For the homogenous case studied in Atlamaz et al. (2008) this is not so much an
issue: preferences (utilities) over the estates are homogenous, there is basically
only one estate and each player is indifferent between different parts of the
estates and only cares about the share of the estate that he obtains. Every Nash
equilibrium is therefore Pareto optimal. In the present model, where preferences
are no longer homogenous and players care not only about the quantity but also
the quality of the estate, this is of course different. Nevertheless, we will show
that Nash equilibria cannot Pareto dominate each other.
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Let (c, u) be an infinite estate problem with associated game (S, p). Consider
two different Nash equilibria σ and σ′, with marginal utility vectors λ and λ′.
Without loss of generality we assume that the conditions in Lemma 3.3 are
satisfied for all s ∈ [0, 1]. Recall that σ¯(s) and σ¯′(s) denote the vectors of shares
of the players at each estate s ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 4.3 Let i, j ∈ N with λ′i/λi > λ′j/λj and let s ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose
σ¯j(s) > 0 and σ¯′i(s) > σ¯i(s). Then σ¯
′
j(s) > σ¯j(s).
Proof. By the conditions in Lemma 3.3 we obtain
λj
uj(s)
=
T (s)− σj(s)
T (s)2
=
1
T (s)
(1− σ¯j(s))
and similarly
λ′j
uj(s)
> 1
T ′(s)
(
1− σ¯′j(s)
)
so that
λ′j
λj
> T (s)
T ′(s)
(
1− σ¯′j(s)
)
(1− σ¯j(s)) .
Similarly, using σ¯′i(s) > 0, we obtain
λ′i
λi
6 T (s)
T ′(s)
(1− σ¯′i(s))
(1− σ¯i(s)) .
Hence (
1− σ¯′j(s)
)
(1− σ¯j(s)) 6
(1− σ¯′i(s))
(1− σ¯i(s)) < 1 ,
which implies σ¯′j(s) > σ¯j(s). ¤
We will use Lemma 4.3 to prove the already announced result that one
Nash equilibrium cannot Pareto dominate another one. Specifically, we have
the following result.
Theorem 4.4 Let (c, u) be an infinite estate problem with associated game
(S, p) and let σ and σ′ be Nash equilibria such that σ¯ 6= σ¯′ on a subset of
[0, 1] of positive measure. Then there are j, k ∈ N with pj(σ) < pj(σ′) and
pk(σ) > pk(σ′).
Proof. Let O be the set of players i with σ¯i(s) = σ¯′i(s) almost everywhere and
let N¯ = N \O. Clearly, N¯ contains at least two players. Take player j ∈ N¯ with
minimal ratio λ′j/λj . For almost all s ∈ [0, 1] we have
∑
i∈N¯ σ¯i(s) =
∑
i∈N¯ σ¯
′
i(s);
so for almost all s, if σ¯j(s) 6= σ¯′j(s) then there is a player i ∈ N¯ with σ¯i(s) <
σ¯′i(s). But then Lemma 4.3 implies that σ¯j(s) < σ¯
′
j(s). Hence, for almost all
s, σ¯j(s) 6 σ¯′j(s), with strict inequality on a subset of [0, 1] of positive measure.
Thus, pj(σ) < pj(σ′).
Now let k ∈ N¯ be a player with maximal ratio λ′k/λk. Then player k has
minimal ratio λk/λ′k and by an argument analogous to the preceding one we
obtain pk(σ) > pk(σ′). ¤
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Example 4.5 For the three Nash equilibria in Example 4.1 where we took x =
6, the payoffs are (5.6, 4.9) for the equilibrium ((3/35, 27/35) , (32/35, 3/35));
(4.9, 5.6) for the equilibrium ((3/35, 32/35) , (27/35, 8/35)); and approximately
(5.29, 5.29) for the symmetric equilibrium ((1/7, 6/7) , (6/7, 1/7)). The payoff
pair (6, 6), obtained by taking σ1 = (0, 1) and σ2 = (1, 0), is Pareto optimal in
the game (S, p), and it is not difficult to show that there is no payoff pair with
sum of payoffs more than 12.
Example 4.5 illustrates the fact that generally speaking Nash equilibrium
payoffs are not Pareto optimal. An interesting question (which we leave for
further research) is how well Nash equilibria perform in terms of welfare. For
instance, one can ask how big the loss of welfare is compared to a Pareto optimal
division of the estates. 4
4.3 Envy-freeness
Envy-freeness is an appealing criterion in order to judge whether an allocation
is fair or equitable. If, however, the agents in an estate problem have different
entitlements then it is difficult to compare their allocations in a solution to
the problem. Generally speaking, larger entitlements lead to larger shares of
the estates in any reasonable solution, and so an agent with a relatively small
entitlement will envy an agent with a large entitlement. Therefore, we restrict
attention to problems in which agents have equal entitlements. For simplicity
we only consider finite estate problems.
Let (M,N, c, u) be a finite estate problem with ci = cj for all i, j ∈ N and
with associated estate game (S, pi) and let σ ∈ S such that∑i∈N σis > 0 for all
s ∈M . We say that σ is envy-free if for all i, j ∈ N :∑
s∈M
σis∑
k∈N σks
· uis >
∑
s∈M
σjs∑
k∈N σks
· uis .
This means that each player i weakly prefers his own allocation to that of
another player j. If the opposite strict inequality holds then we say that player i
envies player j. The following example shows that Nash equilibria need not be
envy-free.
Example 4.6 Let N = {1, 2, 3}, M = {1, 2}, c1 = c2 = c3 = 1/2 and u11 =
u22 = 10, u12 = u21 = u31 = 1, u32 = 16/25. Then
σ11 = σ22 = 1, σ31 =
2
3
, σ32 =
1
3
is a Nash equilibrium, and player 3 envies player 1.
The next result shows that for two players every Nash equilibrium is envy-
free.
4I.e., what is the ‘price of anarchy’, cf. Johari and Tsitsiklis, 2004.
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Theorem 4.7 Let (M, {1, 2}, c, u) be a finite estate problem with c1 = c2, and
let σ be a Nash equilibrium in the associated game (S, pi). Then σ is envy-free.
Proof. We shall prove that ∑
s∈M
σ2s − σ1s
Ts
· u1s 6 0
which means that player 1 does not envy player 2. Since σis > 0 for i =
1, 2 and for all s ∈ M , we have (yis/T 2s ) · uis = (yi1/T 21 ) · ui1, hence uis =
(T 2s /yis)(yi1/T
2
1 ) · ui1, for i = 1, 2 and s ∈M . Then∑
s∈M
σ2s − σ1s
Ts
· u1s = σ21 − σ11
T1
· u11 +
∑
s∈M\{1}
σ2s − σ1s
Ts
T 2s
y1s
y11
T 21
· u11.
Since we just want show that the sum is negative, we can multiply by the positive
number T 21 /(y11 · u11). This yields∑
s∈M
(σ2s − σ1s) Ts
y1s
.
Now, since y1s = σ2s and σ1s + σ2s = Ts, we have∑
s∈M
(σ2s − σ1s) Ts
y1s
=
∑
s∈M
(σ2s − σ1s) Ts
σ2s
=
∑
s∈M
2σ2s − Ts
σ2s
Ts =
∑
s∈M
2Ts− T
2
s
σ2s
.
For any given (Ts)s∈M the σ
′ that maximizes the expression on the right-
hand side under the constraint
∑
s∈M σ
′
2s = m · c2 satisfies the property that
Ts/σ
′
2s is constant for all s, as can easily be checked using Lagrange. Since∑
s∈M Ts/
∑
s∈M σ
′
2s = m(c1 + c2)/mc2 = 2mc2/mc2 = 2, we have Ts/σ
′
2s = 2
for all s. Hence∑
s∈M
2Ts − T
2
s
σ2s
6
∑
s∈M
2Ts − Ts
σ′2s
Ts =
∑
s∈M
2Ts − 2Ts = 0 .
Hence player 1 does not envy player 2. Similarly one shows that player 2 does
not envy player 1. ¤
In the proof of this theorem it used that in a Nash equilibrium every estate
is claimed by at least two players, so that in a two-player estate game every
player puts a positive claim on every estate in an equilibrium. If there are more
than two players then even if every player puts a positive claim on every estate
in a Nash equilibrium, this does not imply that such an equilibrium is envy-free,
as the next example shows.
Example 4.8 Let N = {1, 2, 3}, M = {1, 2}, c1 = c2 = c3 = 6, ui1 = 1 for
i = 1, 2, 3, u12 = 16/35, u22 = 48/25, u32 = 16/25. Then
σ11 = σ22 = 5, σ12 = σ21 = 1, σ31 = 4, σ32 = 2
is a Nash equilibrium, and player 3 envies player 1.
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If the entitlements of the agents in an estate problem are not equal, then it
is not obvious how to define envy-freeness. Further exploration of this subject
is left for future research.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.3. For the only-if part, let σ ∈ Sε be an ε-equilibrium. If
ε > 0 then Ts > nε > 0 for each s ∈ M ; if ε = 0 then Ts = 0 for some s
would imply that each player can improve by putting a small claim on s, a
contradiction. Consider player i ∈ N , then σi solves the problem
max
τi∈Si
∑
s∈M
τisuis
yis + τis
subject to
∑
s∈M τis = mci and τis > ε for all s ∈M .
Considering the Lagrangian for this problem with multiplier λi for the constraint∑
s∈M τis = mci, it follows from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions that
λi >
d
dτis
(
τisuis
yis + τis
)
|τis=σis
=
yisuis
(yis + σis)2
=
yisuis
T 2s
for all s ∈M
with equality if σis > ε. It is easy to see that λi must be positive: otherwise,
yis = 0 for all s, which means that for all j 6= i we would have
∑
s∈M σjs = 0,
a plain contradiction.
For the if-part, it is sufficient to observe that for every player i, under the
conditions stated, σi is a stationary point of the Lagrangian with multiplier λi
and that the Lagrangian is concave. ¤
Proof of Lemma 3.3. For the only-if part, let σ be a Nash equilibrium. If
T (s) = 0 for all s ∈ X where X would have measure larger than zero, then
an arbitrary player could improve by putting a very small positive claim on X.
Consider player i, then σi solves the maximization problem
max
τi
∫ 1
0
τi(s)
yi(s) + τi(s)
ui(s) ds subject to
∫ 1
0
τi(s) ds = ci.
This maximization problem can be formulated as an optimal control problem
max
x
∫ 1
0
x(s)ui(s)
yi(s) + x(s)
ds
subject to X˙(s) = −x(s), x(s) > 0, X(0) = ci, X(1) = 0
with piecewise continuous control variable x(s). The corresponding Lagrangian
is
L =
x(s)ui(s)
yi(s) + x(s)
− pi(s)x(s) + µ(s)x(s)
and the necessary conditions for an optimum are
∂L
∂x(s)
= 0,
∂L
∂pi(s)
= X˙(s),
∂L
∂X(s)
= −p˙i(s), µ(s)x(s) = 0, µ(s) > 0, x(s) > 0.
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Since ∂L/∂X(s) = 0, there is a λi such that pi(s) = λi for all s ∈ [0, 1]. Then,
∂L/∂x(s) = 0 implies
yi(s)ui(s)
(yi(s) + x(s))
2 − λi + µ(s) = 0 for all s ∈ [0, 1].
Hence, if x(s) > 0 then µ(s) = 0 and λi =
yi(s)ui(s)
(yi(s)+x(s))
2 , and if x(s) = 0
then µ(s) > 0 and λi > yi(s)ui(s)(yi(s)+x(s))2 . Furthermore, x(s) > 0 for all s and∫ 1
0
x(s) ds = ci since X˙(s) = −x(s) for all s. Hence, all these conditions are
satisfied for σi. Clearly, λi must be positive.
For the if-part, we provide the following direct argument. Let the stated
conditions hold for σ ∈ S, let i ∈ N and σ′ ∈ Si. We show that player i’s payoff
from σ′ is not larger than his payoff from σ, i.e., that
1∫
0
σ′i(s)
yi(s) + σ′i(s)
· ui(s)ds 6
1∫
0
σi(s)
yi(s) + σi(s)
· ui(s)ds.
Without loss of generality we have assumed here that the denominators in both
integrals are positive for every s ∈ [0, 1]: for the right-hand side the denominator
is positive almost everywhere by assumption, and for the left-hand side we
may approximate σ′ arbitrarily close by a strategy of player i that is positive
everywhere. Now
1∫
0
σ′i(s)
yi(s) + σ′i(s)
· ui(s)ds−
1∫
0
σi(s)
yi(s) + σi(s)
· ui(s)ds
=
1∫
0
(σ′i(s)− σi(s)) yi(s)
(yi(s) + σ′i(s)) (yi(s) + σi(s))
· ui(s)ds
=
1∫
0
(σ′i(s)− σi(s))
yi(s) + σi(s)
yi(s) + σ′i(s)
yi(s)
(yi(s) + σi(s))
2 · ui(s)ds
6
1∫
0
(σ′i(s)− σi(s))
yi(s) + σi(s)
yi(s) + σ′i(s)
λids.
For all s ∈ [0, 1] we have
σ′i(s)− σi(s) > 0⇐⇒
yi(s) + σi(s)
yi(s) + σ′i(s)
< 1
hence
(σ′i(s)− σi(s))
yi(s) + σi(s)
yi(s) + σ′i(s)
6 σ′i(s)− σi(s).
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It follows that
1∫
0
(σ′i(s)− σi(s))
yi(s) + σi(s)
yi(s) + σ′i(s)
λids 6
1∫
0
(σ′i(s)− σi(s))λids
= (ci − ci)λi = 0,
which completes the proof of the if-part.
The last claim in the lemma, σi(s) = T (s) − λiT (s)2/ui(s) if σi(s) > 0, is
straightforward. ¤
The following lemma is an auxiliary result used in the proof of Lemma 3.5
below.
Lemma A.1 Let (a1, . . . , an) be a vector of positive numbers and let (a(1), . . . ,
a(n)) denote a permutation of these numbers such that a(1) 6 . . . 6 a(n). Then
(i) There is a unique j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
(j − 1)a(j) <
j∑
i=1
a(i) 6 (j − 1)a(j+1), (9)
where a(n+1) =∞. If j∗ = j∗(a1, . . . , an) is this unique value, then j∗ > 2.
(ii) The function T : (a1, . . . , an) 7→ (j∗ − 1)/
∑j∗
i=1 a(i) with j
∗ = j∗(a1, . . . ,
an), is continuous.
Proof of Lemma A.1. (i) First note that for j = 1 the inequalities in (9)
imply 0 < a(i) 6 0, an impossibility. Suppose that (9) does not hold for any
j ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}. We claim that (9) holds for j = n. If not, then (n− 1)a(n) >∑n
i=1 a(i). This implies (n−2)a(n) >
∑n−1
i=1 a(i), hence (n−2)a(n−1) >
∑n−1
i=1 a(i)
since otherwise j = n − 1 would satisfy (9). Repeating this argument, we find
a(2) > a(1)+a(2), a contradiction. Hence, (9) holds for some j ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Let
j∗ ≥ 2 be the minimal j for which (9) holds. By the second inequality in (9) we
have (j∗ − 1)a(j∗+1) >
∑j∗
i=1 a(i) and thus j
∗a(j∗+1) >
∑j∗+1
i=1 a(i). This implies
that (9) does not hold for j∗ + 1 instead of j∗. Also, for k > 2,
(j∗ + k − 1)a(j∗+k) > j∗a(j∗+1) + a(j∗+2) + . . .+ a(j∗+k) >
j∗+k∑
i=1
a(i).
So (9) does not hold for any j∗ + k, k > 2.
(ii) Clearly, if both inequalities in (9) are strict for j∗, then T is continuous at
(a1, . . . , an). If the second inequality is an equality, then it is sufficient to prove
that the value of T does not change if we replace j∗ by j∗ + 1, i.e., that
(j∗ − 1)/
j∗∑
i=1
a(i) = j∗/
j∗+1∑
i=1
a(i). (10)
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To show this, write T (j∗) = (j∗ − 1)/∑j∗i=1 a(i) and note that
1
j∗
j∗+1∑
i=1
a(i) =
(j∗ − 1) 1j∗−1
∑j∗
i=1 a(i) + a(j∗+1)
j∗
=
(j∗ − 1) 1T (j∗) + 1T (j∗)
j∗
=
1
T (j∗)
,
implying (10). ¤
Proof of Lemma 3.5. For convenience we drop s from the notations in this
proof. We write ai = λi/ui for every i and without loss of generality assume
that a1 6 . . . 6 an. Let I = {i ∈ N | σi > 0}. The proof proceeds by two
claims.
Claim 1: Let j ∈ I and k < j. Then k ∈ I.
To prove this claim, note that λj = yjuj/T 2 < Tuj/T 2 = uj/T , so λj/uj <
1/T . Hence yk/T 2k 6 λk/uk = ak 6 aj = λj/uj < 1/T . This implies yk < T
and, thus, σk > 0, i.e., k ∈ I.
Claim 1 implies that I = {1, . . . , j} for some j ∈ N .
Claim 2: Let I = {1, . . . , j}. Then
aj <
1
j − 1
j∑
i=1
ai 6 aj+1. (11)
To prove this, first note that σi = T −λiT 2/ui = T −aiT 2 for all i ∈ I. This
implies T =
∑
i∈I σi = jT −
∑
i∈I aiT
2, and thus 1/T = [1/(j − 1)]∑ji=1 ai.
Then
aj =
yj
T 2
<
T
T 2
=
1
T
=
1
j − 1
j∑
i=1
ai,
and
aj+1 >
yj+1
T 2
=
T
T 2
=
1
T
=
1
j − 1
j∑
i=1
ai.
This completes the proof of Claim 2. The first part of the lemma now follows
from part (i) of Lemma A.1. By part (ii) of Lemma A.1, T (s) depends continu-
ously on (λi, ui(s))i∈N , and therefore σ(s) depends continuously on (λi, ui(s))i∈N
as well. ¤
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